Abstract-We propose the concept of Overlay-linked IntServ through several disjoint paths, seeking to improve resilience (OLIntServ), a system architecture that combines network over-and to take advantage of traffic asymmetries.
The increasing reliance on the Internet for time-and mission-critical communications has brought to the forefront II. RELATED WORK concerns about its availability and reliability. Whether due to QoS provision and management has a wide-ranging litnatural traffic fluctuations or large-scale distributed denial of erature. A lot of the early work was stimulated by the service attacks, the available bandwidth for relatively long-promise of ATM networks. The demand for these services lived, time-sensitive communication streams can vary dramati-was stimulated by multimedia traffic. The relevant promise cally over the lifetime of such flows. To address such concerns, was the control of multiplexing behavior in both end-points end-to-end network QoS reservation protocols were designed. and network elements, with the idea that queuing disciplines However, years of research on various QoS architectures such as Fair Queuing or its many variants could be used to for the Internet have resulted in sophisticated proposals that allocate bandwidth resources and provide delay bounds. have not been broadly accepted commercially. In particular,
Despite the ever-increasing use of time-sensitive protocols Integrated Services (IntServ) and Differentiated Services (Diff-(e.g., VoIP, audio on demand, etc.) bandwidth reservation has Serv) have long been supported by major router and operating not been particularly successful. This is caused mainly by system vendors, yet have only seen minimal use in practice. the fear that since these applications have modest bandwidth Without postulating as to the possible reasons behind the lack requirements the operation of a reservation and payment of enthusiasm on behalf of ISPs and users, we recognize the infrastructure would not be feasible economically. Recently, fact that an enterprise that wishes to have some QoS assurances however, newer applications such as video on demand, teletoday (and, we suspect, in the near future) has few options. presence, and Grid Computing, have bandwidth requirements Network overlays has been shown to offer some statistical that may constitute a significant portion of environment, a similar system must deal with billing (i.e., how SOS [3]), with all other traffic being filtered, as shown in the reserved bandwidth can be paid by the user) and must Figure 2 . The secret forwarder can vary over time, and is support bandwidth reservation in a scalable and secure manner. different for each site protected by the overlay; part of the Each reservation carries with it some overhead. This in-functionality built in these indirection mechanisms concerns cludes both protocol overhead, but also state that must be itself with maintaining and propagating this information to maintained by routers for each reservation. As the number other indirection nodes. Otherwise, we assume that the identity of reservations increases so does the overhead. Unless there of the protected server and all indirection nodes is publicly is some kind of aggregation of requests this overhead will known or easily detennined by an attacker. ultimately define an upper bound on the number of reservations that can be accommodated by the existing infrastructure. The complexity of some of the proposed systems [6] , [7] Figure 1 combines two different Our approach with multi-path SOS is straightforward: instead components: a distributed overlay network that is used for of picking one (possibly random) path through the overlay, multi-path routing of traffic between any pair of overlay nodes, spread the packets from the overlay ingress node (or from and a secure RSVP-based reservations system (BandEx) for the end host, if no network reservations are possible) across building a tunnel from either communication end-point to the all indirection nodes in a pseudo-random manner. This new closest overlay node. In essence, the overlay provides the communication mechanism also protects the client-server conmissing link between the IntServ reservations of the end-nection establishment and guarantees uninterrupted connectivpoints. By exploiting redundant available capacity and by ity to the target server throughout the client's session. The spreading the risk of unexpected traffic peaks across many admitted packets are internally forwarded to the overlay egress links, our architecture should minimize the impact of such point (the node to which the remote peer has created an RSVP traffic peaks (or denial of service attacks) on any given link. tunnel to), or to a random overlay node that is authorized Section IV contains some preliminary experimental evidence to forward traffic to the remote end host. Only authorized supporting our hypothesis. We should note that our results are clients are allowed to use the overlay and contact the hosting consistent with independent work on the effect of multi-path servers and these clients are provisioned in advance (e.g., at routing on end-to-end latency [ 10] and availability [ 11 ] . registration time) with the appropriate authentication material,
In the remainder of this section we provide an overview of such as an RSA public/private key pair and a public-key these two components. We refer the reader to our previous certificate. BandExSOS may work in conjunction with filtering work describing these systems in more detail [12] , [4] . routers close to the hosting infrastructure, to allow only traffic from the overlay's egress points (identified through the RSVP A. SpreadSpectrum SOS tunnel) to reach end hosts. All other traffic is filtered out or Our network overlay architecture extends the ideas of SOS at a minimum rate-limited. [3] . SOS effectively implements functionality equivalent to that of a firewall "deep" enough in the network such that B BdEx the access link to an end-host does not become congested
Having provided an effective mechanism for protecting the as a result of a denial of service attack. In terms of network data traffic as it transits the network core, we are left with topology, this typically means the first or second-level router the problem of providing an equivalent level of protection for in the hosting Internet Service Provider's Point-of-Presence the "last-hop". In other words, we need a mechanism that will (POP). This distributed firewall may perform access control safeguard data streams between the connection end-points and by using protocols such as IPsec or TLS, or by relying on au-the BandExSOS core, thentication and authorization services from the system being We propose a mechanism for secure bandwidth reservation protected. Traffic is then routed to a secret location, which by allowing a content provider to pay for a customer's bandcan be the service provider itself or a node that is allowed width, Under our scheme, the content provider (Figure 4 an electronic check for the reservation. The customer then to our discussion. A FLOWSPEC contains the requested QoS initiates a secure-RSVP operation issuing checks guaranteed parameters and the POLICY-DATA object contains information by the provider's check to the ISP's nodes. Eventually the regarding authorization policies for the request. These objects path reaches the overlay cloud. The overlay is considered by are both checked before a reservation is made to ensure that RSVP as one hop, so the path eventually exits the overlay and the request is possible. RSVP uses the FLOWSPEC in admission resource reservation is resumed until the content provider's control to check whether router actually supports and has network is reached, completing the transaction. adequate resources for the desired QoS. Additionally, policy This architecture assumes that the ISP (or ISPs) have a control checks whether the reservation is authorized using the business relationship with the content provider. If this is not information contained within the POLICY-DATA object and the case, then a credit institution such as a bank can act as the most likely, a local policy. Both objects were designed to be link between the two parties. In this case, the credit institution completely opaque to the RSVP specification. That is, RSVP will issue a "spending authorization" credential to the content was not designed for a specific QoS or policy model in mind provider thus completing the chain of trust.
so that it could be extended easily for future QoS and policy control services. KeyNote [13] cremovie, she will be provided with the appropriate bandwidth dentials for bandwidth reservation. These credentials describe purchasing credentials and an RSVPtransaction will be initiated the conditions under which a user is allowed to perform a to create a path between Alice's lmachine and the &P's network. transaction and the fact that a Content Provider is authorized RSVP messages are composed of objects that specify ilm-to participate in a particular transaction.
portant parameters for the reservation exchange. Two of these Initially, the &P encodes the details of the desired bandwidth objects, RSVP's FLOWSPEC and POLICYWDATA, are relevant into a credit azuthorizattionl that is senLt to the customer, along credential from the cP, to the first network element of the ISP. This credential is effectively a check signed by the user Alice contacts her ISP and receives an offer credential that (the Authorizer) and payable to the ISP (the Licensee). The contains the cost and parameters of the reservation. For conditions under which this check is valid match the credit example, 50Mbps on a connection from Dublin to NYC for authorization sent to the user by the cP. Part of the credit 44 cents: authorization is a nonce, which maps payments to specific Keynote-Version: 2 transactions, and prevents double-depositing by the ISP.
Local-Constants:
To determine whether he can expect to be paid (and there-ISP_KEY = '"rsa-base64:7231f .
fore w h o e h y )ROUTE-KEY = "Irsa-base64:33a41 .'.." fore whether to accept the payment), the ISP passes the action Authorizer: ISP_KEY description (the attributes and values in the offer) and the Licensees: ROUTE-KEY user's key along with the ISP's policy (that identifies the cP's Conditions: app_domain == "Band-X" && key), the user credential, the credit authorization credential currency == "USD"' && (signed by the cP), and the microchecks credential (signed &bandwidth <= "150Mbps" && . .~~~~~~~~linkjiame == "Dublin-NYC" && by the user) to his local KeyNote compliance checker. If &amount >= 0i.C44 the compliance checker authorizes the transaction, the ISP && date < "20071120 -> "true"; is guaranteed that the CP will allow payment. The correct Signature: "sig-rsa-shal-base64:ablXXA.. linkage among the ISP's policy, the cP key, the user key, [13] . If the transaction is approved, the ISP can configure as bandwidth, using the Intserv FLOWSPEC notation defined the appropriate routers such that the user's traffic is treated in RFC 2210c With appAdomain == "BAND-X"' && proper authorization to transmit billing and payment records currency == "USD" && amount == "0.44" to the cP for the customers. The csc receives payment records && nonce == "eb2c3dfc8e9a" && from the various ISPs; these records consist of the offer, and date == "20071120" -> "true";
Signature: "Isig-rsa-shal-base64:Qsd.. the KeyNote microcheck and credential from the user sent in response to te offer. o verify that a microcheck i1 good, the The nonce iS a random numbier tat must ie different csc goes through a similar procedure as the ISP did when for each check, guaranteeinLg that there will be no doubleaceting the micoheck. If the KeyNote cmplianc checke depositing of checks. Alice thensends the OfferCredential and approves, the check is accepted. Using her public key as an the micro-check to Nick's router using RSVP. Nick receives index, the user's account is debited for the transactionl amounlt. these credentials, vlidates the microcheck to make sure that Similarly, the ISP's account is credited for the same amount. he will get paid, and configures the router appropriately. If the check is not good, Nick will say so, and refuse to make IV. EVALUATION the reservation. Nick will verify that he will get paid, and , .p. packets across all indirection nodes, without performing any NICK-KEY = "rsa-base64:723f ...ii" measurements or using any type of feedback from the network.
MARTHA-KEY = "rsa-base64:MIGJAo ... g
Authorizer: POLICY Although such analysis has been shown to be beneficial [10] , Licensees: MARTHA-KEY && NICK-KEY our results are encouraging even in the naive case. Conditions:
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our implementation is app-domain == "BAND-XI' -> "true"; its size: excluding cryptographic libraries, the system consists This policy says that anything that Nick's key and the of less than 4,000 lines of well commented C code. Although Martha's key jointly authorize is allowed. Thus, Alice must this is a prototype implementation and does not include submit a valid payment and a valid Offer Credential. Since management code and other facilities that would be required the bandwidth was paid for, and a path can be found from in a production system, we feel that the system is su rrisingly POLICY to a user (Alice) that has delegated to Nick's key, lightweight and easy to comprehend. in the core is handled by another mechanism. Thus, we use Packet Replication reservations only in the portion of the path that they are useful Fig. 5 . End-to-end average latency results for the index page and dispense with them in the part where they cause problems. and a collection of pages for www.cnn.com. The different points denote the change in the end-to-end latency through the overlay The problem of trust is more complex, as allowing a ens-(1is) when compared to the direct connection (1' ). Different tomer to issue a reservation request (e.g., using a reservation lines represent different overlays sizes. Increasing the replication protocol such as RSVP), implies that we need some way to factor and overlay size, we get lower average latency results because of the multi-path effect on the transmritted packets. determine whether we trust the requests issued by the customer to our network elements. The problem is made worse by the Looking at the end-to-end average latency results in Figfact that connections may span provider boundaries, thus the ure 5, we note that as we increase the replication factor (i.e., network elements of a remote provider may receive requests the number of packet copies that are routed through different from a customer that has no previous relationship with the paths in the overlay), and for larger overlay networks, we get provider. Our system addresses this by limiting both the num-better average latency results. The worst-case scenario involves ber of network elements that need to receive reservations and a 2.5 increase in latency, dropping to 1.5 with 50% packet the domains that need to be crossed before reaching the core replication (i.e. probability of replicating a packet of 50%). overlay network, and by allowing a (relatively) small number To measure the effectiveness of our system in the presence of entities (the content providers) to have tnsted relationships of highly variable traffic, we simulated network unreachability with the ISP. For connections spanning national boundaries, by disabling overlay nodes at random. In our experiment, the our framework also supports the use of credit in3stitutions (e.g., overlay ingress point kept spreading data across all overlay banks) that can form a top level trust layer, linking ISP to nodes, since it was unaware which of the overlay nodes were content providers in remote Jurisdictions. Note that the trust temporarily unreachable (n3o feedback). We then3 varied the strncture is independent of the overlay mechanism.
portion of the overlay nodes we disabled and measured the less than 25% when up to 50% of paths fail. We describe our prototype system architecture that uses our resulting increase in latency. The results are shown in Figure 6 . SpreadSpectrum SOS overlay network [12] and the BandEx When we do not use any replication, TCP connections perform secure network reservations system [4] . By combining the two relatively well when the losses are up to 9%-10% of the scr ewr eevtossse 4.B obnn h w totatel packets heransmitthed. losswes rease the packet replicathe systems, it is possible to provide a secure, highly available, total packets transmitted. As we increase the packet replication disruption-tolerant end-to-end path without requiring end-tofactor, we achieve higher network resilience.
end (across multiple ISPs) availability of QoS reservation
The dominant cost of the reservation component is that primitives such as DiffServ. Our preliminary experimental of authentication and authorization, i.e., in the evaluation of results show that this approach promises to help bridge the the credentials to determine whether the request is consistent gap between inter-and intra-ISP network reservations. Our requestsh the y e in the a shown e we sow plans for future work include building and deploying a full reuet it system prototype, conducting further experiments using realexample, one or more credit institutions may be used to link time traffic and delay-sensitive applications, and examining the the content provider with various ISPs. For this reason, network impact of smart attacks against the system. elements may receive requests containing chains of two or XE N more credentials and hence expend more computational power
